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1 | INTRODUCTION
The bank lending channel posits that central banks—at least in part—can control banking sector’s
ability to lend by adjusting the reserve supply via open market operations. On a contractionary pol-
icy, open market operations of central banks drain reserves and hence deposits from the banking
system. If banks are not able to find alternative sources of funding to compensate for this deposit
withdrawal, the supply of bank loans will decrease. Although this spillover chain is well estab-
lished for varying size (Kashyap & Stein, 1995; Stein & Kashyap, 2000), liquidity (Ashcraft,
2006; Stein & Kashyap, 2000) and capitalisation (Kishan & Opiela, 2000) of banks, there is still
lack of evidence on how this mechanism works for different bank types. Studying the monetary
transmission mechanism for different bank types is relevant because it may have different impacts
on bank lending. This is especially important to identify how effectively central banks can influ-
ence the level of reserves (deposits) and, as a consequence, bank lending (credits). In this study,
we empirically compare the bank lending channel in a dual banking system where Islamic and
conventional banks operate side by side. Since the bank lending channel incorporates the beha-
viour of customers and creditors in a single transmission mechanism, we will be able to understand
different behavioural patterns of both of these groups in different banking schemes.
Although Islamic and conventional banks fulfil similar intermediary roles, moral foundations of
Islamic banking make Islamic banks and their depositors distinct from those of conventional banks.
From a customer’s perspective, Islamic banks contribute to financial inclusion by attracting reli-
giously motivated customers into the system (e.g. Kumru & Sarntisart, 2016). Islamic banks may
represent a morally appealing alternative for those customers whose financial preferences are dri-
ven by religious beliefs. Religiosity also appears to be a major determinant for consumer choice
behaviour (Essoo & Dibb, 2004), irrespective of the religion the individual is attached to (see e.g.
Wilkes, Burnett, & Howell, 1986). For instance, Miller and Hoffmann (1995) report a negative
correlation between religiosity and attitudes towards risk at individual level. Similarly, Hilary and
Hui (2009) find that firms located in US counties with high levels of religiosity tend to exhibit
lower risk exposure as measured by the variances in returns on assets or equity. In a similar vein,
as argued by Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi (2013), Islamic bank depositors are more sensitive
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to bank performance and macroeconomic shocks and demonstrate greater withdrawal risk than
their conventional counterparts.
From the bank’s perspective too, whether or not having a religious affiliation might have an
influence on the willingness to supply credit. Since Islamic banks employ several unique financial
models and contracts, the customer portfolios of Islamic and conventional banks may substantially
vary. Further, recent research suggests that conventional banks put more weight on collateral in
their credit allocation decisions (e.g. Aysan, Disli, Ng, & Ozturk, 2016; Shaban, Duygun, Anwar,
& Akbar, 2014). Because of their opaque nature, especially the small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) segment of the market seems to face credit constraints from this practice (Carpenter &
Petersen, 2002). Islamic banks, on the other hand, may be more attractive to SMEs since they sub-
stantially relieve collateral requirements by making use of murabaha1 contracts. Moreover, in a
dual banking system, conventional banks are generally more established houses and have solid
relations with larger firms who have “hard” information. Islamic banks, which still hold marginal
shares in the banking systems, may fulfil SMEs’ credit demand by relying on “soft” information.
Despite their strong growth, Islamic banks still do not hold a significant place in the banking
industry, which forces them to target the untapped SME market. Recent empirical results using
data from Indonesia (Shaban et al., 2014) and Turkey (Aysan, Disli, Ng, et al., 2016) show that
Islamic banks’ willingness to finance SMEs is significantly higher than that of conventional banks.
However, given the growing body of evidence that small businesses are more exposed to economic
and policy shocks (see e.g. Berger & Udell, 2002; ECB, 2016; OECD, 2012), it can be argued that
Islamic bank lending is more sensitive to monetary and economic shocks.
Especially since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, Islamic banking has emerged as a
viable complementary scheme in the global banking system. Parallel to the rising visibility of the
Islamic banking sector, growing academic attention has resulted in a wide range of research foci.
A number of studies have focused on the efficiency differences between Islamic and conventional
banks (e.g. Abdul-Majid, Saal, & Battisti, 2010; Samad, 1999; Srairi, 2010), while others have
documented operational differences between them (e.g. Beck, Demirg€uc-Kunt, & Merrouche,
2013; Daher, Masih, & Ibrahim, 2015; Elnahass, Izzeldin, & Abdelsalam, 2014; Ibrahim, 2016;
Iqbal, 2001). Another stream of research has explored the resilience of Islamic banks with the out-
break of the 2008 global financial crisis (Abedifar et al., 2013; Cihak & Hesse, 2010; Hasan &
Dridi, 2011; Rajhi & Hassairi, 2013). Closer to this study, there is a growing literature that exami-
nes the impact of monetary policy and several transmission channels in a dual banking environ-
ment. Among these studies, for instance, Sukmana and Kassim (2010) and Zulkhibri and Sukmana
(2016) examine, respectively, the behaviour of Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic banks in the
monetary transmission process. Both of these studies conclude that Islamic financial institutions
play a significant role in the monetary transmission. Zaheer, Ongena, and van Wijnbergen (2013)
study the differences of banks’ responses to monetary shocks across bank size, liquidity and bank
type in Pakistan. They find that Islamic banks’ reaction to monetary shocks is relatively limited
and conclude that the bank lending channel may weaken when Islamic banking grows in relative
importance. In line with the above-mentioned literature, this paper first separately examines the
presence of the bank lending channel for the transmission of monetary policy through Islamic and
conventional banks in Turkey. We then provide an in-depth discussion of the observed differences
and explore the potential reasons for this discrepancy by conducting additional exercises and
robustness checks.
1
In a murabaha contract, the bank buys a product on behalf of a client and resells the product to the same client with the
cost of the product and a mark-up (margin).
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This study contributes to the strand of literature that investigates the behavioural differences
between Islamic and conventional finance (Abdelsalam, Fethi, Matallın, & Tortosa-Ausina, 2014;
BinMahfouz & Hassan, 2012). While the influence of monetary shocks is frequently discussed for
conventional banks, research in examining the role of Islamic banks in the monetary transmission
process is still very limited. We focus on the change in depositing and lending behaviour at Islamic
and conventional banks as a response to monetary shocks. In doing so, this paper contributes to the
literature in a number ways. First, Turkey presents a fertile testing ground since Islamic banks oper-
ate side by side with conventional banks for over thirty years. Subsequent government initiatives
have gradually allowed Islamic banking to expand their business activities. Especially, the reforms
and regulations in the last decade have effectively removed some discriminatory regulations against
Islamic banks. The dual structure of Turkish banking allows us to conduct a comparative analysis
on the impact of monetary policy shocks between Islamic and conventional banks, both of which
are now subject to the same regulation and supervision. Hence, the lack of different regulatory treat-
ment leads us to attribute any different response to operational and behavioural differences between
these two banking modes. Second, by making use of a complementary data set, we point to the role
of SME lending as one of the major reasons behind the different responses to monetary shocks.
SMEs are recognised as the engines of economic growth and key contributors to employment, but
face significant barriers to access to external finance. By introducing the SME segment of the credit
market into our analyses, we are able to reveal whether the different effects of monetary policy on
lending between Islamic and conventional banks are driven by these banks’ differences in SME
financing behaviour. As a final contribution, we examine depositors’ and creditors’ responses to
policy rate changes using a panel vector autoregression (panel-VAR) framework, which controls for
the rarely addressed bank-level heterogeneity in bank lending channel studies.
Our results support the existence of the bank lending channel in Turkey. In response to a policy
rate increase, banks are confronted with deposit withdrawals since customers seek alternative
investment opportunities with higher returns. This decline in deposits, in turn, decreases the vol-
ume of bank lending. We, however, observe that responses of deposits and credits to monetary
shocks are larger for Islamic banks. Impulse responses for conventional and Islamic banks reveal
that Islamic bank depositors’ sensitivity to policy rate changes is substantially larger than their con-
ventional counterparts. As a response to one standard deviation policy rate increases, deposit with-
drawals at Islamic banks exceeds 5% at the end of six quarters, whereas this is only around 2% for
conventional banks. We find similar results vis-a-vis lending activities, indicating that the demand
for credits is more affected in Islamic banks following an policy rate change. We discuss the
potential reasons how and why deposits and credits in Islamic banks respond more pronouncedly
to policy rate changes.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature and pre-
sents the motivation. Section 3 briefly introduces the dual banking system in Turkey. Section 4
introduces the data and methodology. Section 5 discusses the main findings and presents some
robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 | BRIEF LITERATURE SURVEY AND MOTIVATION
This study examines the presence of the bank lending channel by verifying the responses of bank
loans and deposits to changes in monetary policy stance. In their seminal work, Bernanke and
Blinder (1992) argue that reserves in the banking system drains steadily following an increase in
the policy rate. In a chain reaction, a deposit shock triggered by a monetary policy change impacts
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bank lending. Since it will be costly and timely to complement the withdrawn deposits through
other sources, banks accordingly tune their lending.
How this transmission mechanism works for Islamic banks is not clear. The transmission can
be ineffective among Islamic banks since Islamic banking operations ideally should not be linked
to interest rates. A priori proposition would suggest that Islamic banks and their depositors are
insensitive to policy rate changes since the main pillar of Islamic banking is the prohibition of riba
(interest). Islamic banks operate like equity-based companies where depositors are treated as quasi-
shareholders (Aysan, Disli, Duygun, & Ozturk, 2017; Khan & Mirakhor, 1989). In this business
model, banks share their earnings with their depositors according to a pre-agreed rate of return.
The ideal mode of Islamic financing which is based on profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) may hint that
conventional monetary policy tools should not be operational on Islamic banks.
Although Islamic banking strictly prohibits interest, the monetary transmission mechanism may
still be operational in these banks based on several grounds. First, contrary to the propositions of the
PLS paradigm, it is known that the current Islamic banking practice primarily relies on the non-PLS
model (Khan, 2010). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that Islamic deposit rates are closely
pegged to conventional deposit rates (Cevik & Charap, 2015; Chong & Liu, 2009; Dar & Presley,
1999). Alam and Parinduri (2017) explore the possible reasons why Islamic banks mostly prefer non-
PLS instruments as opposed to the wisdom in Islamic finance that suggests risk sharing. By hypothe-
sising that one of the reasons is the poor contracting environment, the authors investigate whether
Islamic banks shift to PLS instruments with increasing quality of contracting environment. The find-
ings of their study indicate that Islamic banks’ tendency of non-PLS instruments is not driven by the
quality of contracting environment. As Alam and Parinduri (2017) conclude, the policies for enhanc-
ing contracting environment are unlikely to change Islamic banks’ asset preferences. Hence, because
of the prevalence of non-PLS products and inefficacy of policies to encourage PLS products, it is
possible that depositors and creditors in Islamic banks may also respond to policy rate changes. Sec-
ond, the argument that Islamic bank depositors are expected not to leave their banks as a response to
policy rate changes is hard to defend.2 Islamic bank depositors may reconsider their investment at
their banks as policy rate changes potentially make alternative Sharia-compliant investment opportu-
nities more attractive, for example, real estate investments. Therefore, it is hard to decisively argue
that Islamic banks are not responsive to monetary policy. Third, Islamic banks may not be as success-
ful as conventional banks to restore the level of deposits after a positive policy rate shock. Conven-
tional banks are better positioned to adjust their deposit interest rates quickly to attract displaced
deposits, while Islamic banks react more sluggishly. This adjustment delay may hinder these banks to
efficiently collect the withdrawn deposits. While some pious individuals will keep their money in
Islamic banks no matter what the policy rate is, the others may “arbitrage”.3 Fourth, Islamic banks
have reduced access to (Sharia-compliant) non-deposit funding sources which amplify the lending
channel through these banks. When deposits are reduced as a response to monetary shocks, Islamic
banks often have limited capacity to compensate these withdrawn deposits. Finally, the favourable
attitude of Islamic banks towards largely bank-dependent companies (or SMEs) may be another rea-
son for why the bank lending channel may be amplified through these banks. Monetary and macroe-
conomic shocks impact SMEs more severely than larger firms in their demand for credits.
The impact of monetary policy in a dual banking system has been examined in a number of
studies. Ito (2013), for example, examines the Malaysian banking sector and finds that Islamic
2
Demiralp and Demiralp (2015) argue that period of adjustment following a monetary policy action in Islamic banking con-
stitutes a conundrum between religious convictions and optimal return judgments for Islamic bank depositors.
3
We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting us this explanation for a possible reason.
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deposit returns and conventional interest rates co-move in Malaysia. The author interprets this find-
ing as the existence of significant commons in Islamic and conventional banks. Likewise, Ergec
and Arslan (2013) examine the Turkish banking system and find that the impact of monetary
shocks on Islamic and conventional deposits is similar. El Hamiani Khatat (2016) discusses the
key issues for conducting monetary policies in countries where Islamic banks and conventional
banks coexist. Having underlined similarities and differences, there is almost a consensus among
researchers that Islamic banking should be taken as an autonomous process in conducting mone-
tary policy. Sukmana and Kassim (2010) imply the necessity of a dual monetary policy formula-
tion, as their findings raise the importance of Islamic banks in the monetary transmission in dual
banking systems. The dual policy formulation is also underlined by Haron and Nursofiza Wan
Azmi (2008) who investigate the impact of selected economic variables on deposits in the Malay-
sian dual banking system. The authors find that deposits respond differently at Islamic and conven-
tional banks and discuss the role of religious beliefs in depositors’ banking decisions.
Despite some evidence on the relation between monetary policy and several return rates in Isla-
mic banking, hitherto analysis did not explore the underlying reasons for why the bank lending
channel works differently in these two different banking schemes. In this paper, we seek to better
understand the role of operational differences in the explanation of different monetary transmis-
sions between Islamic and conventional banks.
3 | A BRIEF HISTORY OF DUAL BANKING IN TURKEY
Turkey’s banking history is closely related to other emerging economies. The absence of adequate
resources and the need for rapid industrialisation instigated policymakers to use the banking system
as a pool of financing for development. The government control over the banking system, where
only conventional banks were operating, was substantial till the 1980s. Along with stiff entry barri-
ers, interest rate controls, and directed credit programmes, the competition and efficiency in the
Turkish banking system were hampered to such degree that, by the 1980s, heavy government
involvement had relaxed significantly (Denizer, 1997).
Beginning from June 1980, more deregulatory and liberal measures were adopted in the Turkish
banking system. The initial outcome of these measures was relatively positive during this period. It
is reported that efficiency gains were remarkable after the implementation of various deregulatory
measures (Isik & Hassan, 2002; Zaim, 1995). It is also claimed that the integration process of the
Turkish banking system to global finance brought about enhanced financial technology and better
equipped human capital (Denizer, 1997). The deregulatory measures allowed cross-border fund
flows that the country was in need of, and specifically lifted entry barriers to the banking system.
Related with the scope of this study, the adoption of deregulatory measures has attracted a signifi-
cant number of banks into the system, including Islamic banks. While the early motivation for the
establishment of Islamic banks in Turkey was to attract foreign capital to the country, stimulated
partly by the growing awareness of the Muslim population, Islamic banking has increasingly for-
mulated itself as an alternative to the conventional banking model.
Turkey’s Islamic finance debuted in 1985 with the Bahrain-based Al-Baraka Turk Finance
House (Albaraka T€urk Finans Kurumu) and Saudi-based Faisal Finance House (Faisal Finans
Kurumu). Kuveyt Turk followed these ones and joined the system in 1989. In the 1990s, Anadolu
Finance House, Ihlas Finance House, and Asya Finance House (Anadolu Finans Kurumu, _Ihlas
Finans Kurumu and Asya Finans Kurumu) entered the market with 100% domestic capital. As the
name “Finance House” suggests, these institutions did not enjoy the same status as conventional
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banks. Until late 2005, these banks remained subject to discriminatory regulations which intro-
duced certain rights to conventional banks but not to the finance houses. For instance, Aysan,
Disli, and Ozturk (2013) convey that Islamic banks were not fully covered by a deposit guarantee
scheme, although a comprehensive scheme was used to cover conventional deposits.
In line with the interest globally towards Islamic banking, Turkey has introduced several
favourable regulatory changes to Islamic banks. The legislative changes in late 2005 have elimi-
nated the deprivations and provided a more constructive environment for Islamic banks. Islamic
banks eventually gained a legal “bank” status that led to equal regulatory treatment. Finally, sig-
nalling the governments’ favourable attitude, since 2015, two more banks, Ziraat and Vakif Partici-
pation banks (Ziraat Katιlιm Bankasι and Vakιf Katιlιm Bankasι) have been authorised to operate
as the first state-owned Islamic banks.
Newly established state-owned Islamic banks may be encouraging for the future of the Islamic
banking in the country; however, the capacity of Islamic banks to use various financing sources is
still limited. The single formulation of monetary policy and binding constraints in Islamic banking
originating from Islamic principles lead to certain challenges for these banks. While documenting
the deficiencies in the Turkish Islamic banking, Okumus (2016) notes the lack of a time deposit
scheme having less than 30 days maturity. The author informs that especially those corporate cli-
ents needing their money in less than 30 days accounts for their liquidity management are left out
with no viable option. As Okumus (2016) argues, the options they have in hand are mostly inter-
est-bearing. They either go to a conventional bank for an overnight or some other shorter maturity
date repurchase (repo) agreement, or for a time deposit account maturing in a chosen time period,
or for a liquid/short-term bond and bills; or they put the money in checking accounts of a partici-
pation bank with no return. Having pointed out that recent regulations treat Islamic banks equally
with conventional banks, regulatory arrangements and monetary policy formulation towards banks
in the Turkish dual banking system is also unishaped. Reserve requirements that were introduced
as an active tool in addition to the traditional policy instrument of the 1-week repo auctions rate,
for instance, do not discriminate Islamic banks in anyway. However, the issuance of sukuk, an Isla-
mic fixed income instrument, introduced certain flexibility for the government and corporations to
raise funds. The growing sukuk market also allows Islamic banks to access short-term liquidity
funding, as the Central Bank of Turkey (T€urkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasι) began accepting
sukuks as an eligible collateral in open market operations.
4 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We compare Islamic and conventional banks in their responses to monetary shocks. To do this, we
use an unbalanced panel data set for the period of 2004Q3–2012Q4. The unbalanced panel comprises
35 conventional banks and four Islamic banks. Balance sheet and income statement information for
conventional banks are derived from the Banks Association of Turkey, and those of Islamic banks
are from the Participation Banks Association of Turkey.
We estimate a panel-VAR model with quarterly data for Turkey. We then obtain impulse
response functions (IRFs) to measure the response of deposits and credits to monetary shocks in
conventional and Islamic banks.4 In the panel-VAR methodology, the key assumption is that the
variables that enter the system earlier affect the following variables contemporaneously and with a
lag, while the variables that come later affect the previous variables only with a lag (Love &
4
Islamic banks in Turkey are named as Participation Banks.
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Zicchino, 2006). This implies that the variables that enter earlier are more exogenous and the later
ones are more endogenous. We use the following variables in the listed Choleski ordering: policy
rate (ir), US dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate (fx), consumer price index (cpi), total deposits (de-
posits) and total credits (credits).
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The main vari-
ables in the table are credits and deposits which are presented for the whole sample and for con-
ventional and Islamic banks separately. We log-transform credits and deposits data (credits and
deposits), and use the others on their levels.5 We use overnight money market rate of the Central
Bank of Turkey as the policy rate, (ir). We compute the average overnight rates per quarter during
the sample period to proxy for policy rates. The quarterly average of US dollar/Turkish lira
exchange rate is used as the foreign exchange variable ( fx).
The deposits data in our analysis comprises those deposits which are covered by the deposit
insurance scheme. Next to the fact that insured deposits constitute the bulk of total deposits,
insured deposit holders may display different behaviour than uninsured deposit holders with
respect to monetary shocks (Demirg€uc-Kunt & Kane, 2002; Karas, Pyle, & Schoors, 2013).
Andries and Billon (2010), for instance, theoretically show that deposits under insurance exhibit a
more stable pattern in response to a monetary shock. In the case of increasing bank risk and corre-
sponding monetary policy interventions, for instance, uninsured deposit holders’ response to mone-
tary shocks is augmented with the risk of bank failure. Deposit insurance therefore eliminates these
possibilities and enables us to concentrate on the relationship among monetary policy, credit provi-
sion and deposits.
We use the panel-VAR methodology which extends the traditional VAR approach to a panel
setting to control for bank-level heterogeneity. As in the traditional VAR approach, the variables
TABLE 1 Summary statistics
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Banking system
Credits Total credits 975 14.81 2.44 6.11 18.52
Deposits Total deposits 986 13.39 2.71 6.10 17.47
Conventional banks
Credits Total credits 847 14.74 2.60 6.11 18.52
Deposits Total deposits 858 13.25 2.87 6.10 17.47
Islamic banks
Credits Total credits 128 15.27 0.71 13.70 16.54
Deposits Total deposits 128 14.38 0.55 13.05 15.33
Macroeconomic and monetary variables
fx US dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate 986 1.49 0.19 1.17 1.86
cpi Quarterly change in consumer price index 953 3.16 2.28 0.58 10.76
ir Policy rate 986 11.45 5.81 1.50 21.48
Note: The deposit and credit amounts are in thousand Turkish lira and are log-transformed. The policy rate is the quarterly average
of overnight money market rate. Consumer price index is the quarterly change in consumer price index. Foreign exchange rate is
the quarterly average of US dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate.
5
See Demiralp and Demiralp (2015) and Love and Turk Ariss (2014) for similar variable transformations in their VAR
framework.
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in the system are treated as endogenous. We specify our model of order s as follows:
Zi;t ¼ C0 þ fi þ C1Zi;t1 þ C2Zi;t2 þ    þ CsZi;ts þ ei;t: (1)
In this specification, the variables ir, fx, cpi, deposits and credits are the components of a vector Z in
the VAR system for bank i and time t. Since the time dimension of our panel is small, we estimate a
one-lag panel-VAR to investigate the depositors’ and creditors’ responses to policy rate changes. In all
estimations, we control for bank-level heterogeneity by incorporating fi as proposed by Holtz-Eakin,
Newey, and Rosen (1988). We exploit “Helmert procedure” that uses forward mean-differencing. In this
procedure, the fixed effects (fi) are eliminated by the transformation in deviations from forward means.
Let zkim ¼
PTi
s¼mþ1 z
k
is
Tim denotes the means obtained from the future values of a variable z
k
i , a vari-
able in the p-variable vector Zi ¼ ðz1i ; z2i ; . . .; zki ; . . .; zpi Þ0, at t = m. Ti denotes the last period of data
available for a given bank series. Let ekim denotes the same transformation for e
k
im, where
ei ¼ ðe1i ; e2i ; . . .; eki ; . . .; epi Þ0. Hence, we get following variables after Helmert transformation,
~zkim ¼ ditðzkim  zkimÞ and ~ekim ¼ ditðekim  ekimÞ where dit ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Tim
Timþ1
q
. The final transformed model is
thus given by:
~Zi;t ¼ C0 þ fi þ C1~Zi;t1 þ C2~Zi;t2 þ    þ Cs~Zi;ts þ ~ei;t: (2)
This transformation satisfies the orthogonality assumption between transformed variables and
lagged regressors. Therefore, we can use lagged dependent variables as instruments and estimate
the coefficients by system GMM (Love & Zicchino, 2006).
To analyse the potential effects of monetary shocks (ir) on deposits and credits (deposits and
credits), we generate impulse response functions for each variable to show how each variable
responds to individual shocks of other variables in the system. In this approach, the response of a
variable to the shock of transmitted from another variable is estimated where shocks to other vari-
ables in the system are held constant. To do so, it is necessary to decompose the residuals so that
they are orthogonal which can be accomplished by ordering the variables, namely Choleski order-
ing (Hamilton, 1994).
5 | RESULTS
5.1 | Empirical findings
We initially conduct a unit root test on all the variables used in the analysis to address concerns
about the presence of unit roots. We use Fisher’s test statistics for panel unit root (see Maddala &
Wu, 1999), since this test does not require a balanced panel unlike the Im–Paseran–Shin test pro-
posed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003). Table 2 presents the results of the Fisher augmented
Dickey–Fuller and Fisher Phillips–Perron unit root tests, where the null hypothesis is that all series
are non-stationary and the alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the series in the panel is sta-
tionary. Since panel-VAR employs Helmert-transformed variables, we present the results for the
original variables and their Helmert transformations. Panel unit root test results suggest that both
Fisher augmented Dickey–Fuller and Fisher Phillips–Perron reject the presence of unit roots at
conventional significance levels. We therefore consider all variables as stationary based on the test
results and use Helmert-transformed variables in the panel-VARs.
Before discussing the Panel-VAR results, we draw scatter plots of deposits and credits on the
policy rate for both Islamic and conventional banks. Figures 1 and 2 fit a simple regression line to
have an idea whether the expected outcome of monetary shocks is observable on raw credits and
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deposits data. These two figures demonstrate that, regardless of the bank type, deposits and credits
are negatively associated with policy rates. The slopes of figures pertaining to Islamic banks are,
however, steeper, mimicking the larger response of Islamic banks’ customers to monetary shocks.
Since the IRFs are constructed from the estimated coefficients in panel-VAR models, the stan-
dard errors of estimated coefficients need to be calculated. Monte Carlo simulations are used for
generating confidence intervals for the IRFs. This is conducted by taking random draws of the
models’ coefficients, using the estimated coefficients and their variance—covariance matrix. We
take 500 draws. The 5th and 95th percentiles of the results are used to interpret on the confidence
intervals of the impulse responses. If the confidence intervals do not span the zero line, we inter-
pret the results are significant, that is, rejecting the hypothesis that impulse responses are zero.
We report how credits and deposits respond to monetary, foreign exchange and inflation
shocks.6 We first display the conventional and Islamic bank deposit responses to monetary shocks
in Figure 3. The results suggest that depositors in both Islamic and conventional banks respond
negatively to monetary shocks. When we are interested in the degree of sensitivity, we observe
TABLE 2 Panel unit root tests
Variable Definition
Augmented
Dickey–Fuller Phillips–Perron
Conventional banks
Credits Total credits 147.34*** 78.90**
h–Credits Helmert-transformed total credits 161.76*** 115.90***
Deposits Total deposits 89.92*** 161.75***
h–Deposits Helmert-transformed total deposits 84.90*** 141.03***
Islamic banks
Credits Total credits 27.64*** 14.90*
h–Credits Helmert-transformed total credits 24.94*** 14.74*
Deposits Total deposits 23.37*** 25.13***
h–Deposits Helmert-transformed total deposits 19.01** 14.90*
Macroeconomic and monetary variables
fx US dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate 92.08** 96.17**
h–fx Helmert-transformed US dollar/Turkish
lira exchange rate
277.18*** 85.31*
cpi Quarterly change in consumer price index 710.88*** 941.97***
h–cpi Helmert-transformed quarterly change in
consumer price index
680.35*** 965.84***
ir Policy rate 92.08** 96.17**
h–ir Helmert-transformed policy rate 178.95*** 127.50***
Note: The deposit and credit amounts are in thousand Turkish lira and are log-transformed. The policy rate is the quarterly average
of overnight money market rate. Consumer price index is the quarterly change in consumer price index. Foreign exchange rate is
the quarterly average of US dollar/Turkish lira exchange rate. “h–” represents the Helmert transformation that is used in the panel-
VARs. *, ** and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
6
All impulse response functions are provided in Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix. We discuss main findings derived
from the responses of credits and deposits to the shocks in economic and monetary variables.
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that Islamic bank depositors respond more strongly to monetary shocks. Deposits’ response to a
shock in policy rates is larger than in conventional banks: a one standard deviation policy rate
shock is associated with a 5% withdrawal after two quarters in Islamic banks, whereas in conven-
tional banks the withdrawal could only reach to 2% at the end of four quarters. Higher sensitivity
of Islamic bank depositors can be explained by the prohibition of interest in Islamic banks. Mone-
tary changes create a period of adjustment in Islamic bank rates as Islamic banks distribute ex-post
returns, whereas conventional banks can more abruptly accommodate policy rate changes. Demi-
ralp and Demiralp (2015) argue that this adjustment process is a good laboratory setting to explore
whether Islamic bank depositors are loyal to their banks. As our results suggest, during the time of
adjustment Islamic bank depositors may withdraw their deposits once the returns offered by alter-
native investments are higher at the new monetary condition.
Figure 4 demonstrates the credits’ response to monetary shocks. Similar to the responses in
deposits, Islamic banks’ response in credits to monetary shocks is again larger than the one
observed in conventional banks. While the negative response to a positive policy rate shock
exceeds 5% after three quarters in Islamic banks, conventional bank credits do not respond signifi-
cantly to policy shocks. Our findings thus support the view that the existence of a lending channel
is particularly relevant for Islamic banks.
We explain above findings both from supply and demand side of lending. Regarding the supply
side of lending, all these results suggest that Islamic banks were worse in complementing deposit
withdrawals with alternative sources of funds. These findings are related to those of Carpenter and
Demiralp (2009) and Demiralp (2008) who argue that banks in emerging countries may not be
capable of finding alternative sources to replace deposits as the banks of advanced countries which
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can find funding sources via alternative borrowing instruments, like bond issuances. As Islamic
banks are small and have limited access to funding, lending in these banks is more responsive to
monetary shocks (Kishan & Opiela, 2000).
In view of the demand side of lending, the results show that the bank lending channel of mone-
tary transmission is more effective on SMEs. SMEs are more vulnerable to monetary shocks due
to the shortage of available funds at a bearable cost. This is in line with the findings of Ali,
Choudhary, Hussain, and Gabriel (2012) and Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002) who find that
SMEs disproportionately share the burden of a monetary shock. Although a strong relationship
with a bank may save SMEs from monetary shocks to some extent (Zaheer et al., 2013), long-
lived monetary shocks hit SMEs more severe than large businesses. Moreover, larger firms are less
affected by the higher cost of policy rate changes through recourse of alternative funding sources.
This is especially true when the firms’ expected future profits from the projects for which they are
applying credit are well above the burden of monetary shocks. Our findings thus support the view
that the existence of the bank lending channel is particularly relevant for SMEs as they are more
vulnerable to monetary shocks (Kishan & Opiela, 2000).
Although our main research focus is the examination of the impact of monetary shocks on
deposits and credits, the panel-VAR framework we build also combines the interrelations between
macroeconomic variables and bank-level variables. We hereafter explore how various macroecon-
omic shocks affect bank-level variables. It is worth noting before discussing the IRFs of bank—
variables to macroeconomic shocks that the IRFs pertaining to Islamic banks are larger and most
of them are close to significance at 95% level, while the IRFs of conventional banks are smaller in
magnitude and often insignificant, which confirms more responsiveness of Islamic banks.
–0.1000
–0.0500
0.0000
0.0500
Cr
ed
it_
Co
nv
en
tio
na
l
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s
ir shock
–0.2500
–0.2000
–0.1500
–0.1000
–0.0500
0.0000
Cr
ed
it_
Is
la
m
ic
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s
ir shock
FIGURE 4 Impulse responses of credits to policy rate shocks: conventional versus Islamic banks
AYSAN ET AL. | 685
Figures 5 and 6 plot the responses of credits and deposits in Islamic and conventional banks to
inflation shocks. Both credits and deposits in Islamic banks respond negatively to inflation shocks.
Credits and deposits in conventional banks also respond similarly, but the response of deposits at
the initial quarters is positive and then turns out to be negative afterwards. The responses are larger
and significant in Islamic banks similar to those responses to monetary shocks. The findings sug-
gest that depositors demand higher interest against higher inflation and thus shrinking net return.
Once their higher return demand is not met by the banks, depositors consider switching to other
banks or withdrawing their deposits to invest in other investments or keep it in cash. Since Islamic
banks cannot alter their rates paid on deposits swiftly to offset net return losses, Islamic bank
depositors become more disadvantaged relative to conventional bank depositors. The credits
response to inflation is explicable from changing supply and demand conditions of lending at dif-
ferent inflation regimes. Due to uncertainty created by positive inflation shocks, credit supply and
demand faced with significant deterioration (Basci, 2006; Brooks, 2007). Banks’ preference to
credits is reduced by higher returns offered by other assets, for example, government bonds. More-
over, SMEs’ demand for credit shrinks due to higher capital expenditure and increased cost of pro-
duction for goods. Larger businesses are generally better positioned to bear the brunt of inflation,
as the burden can be offset by savings generated by economies of scale. SMEs, however, often
take a direct hit on margin from inflation shocks. The end result is the more reduction of credit
demand in Islamic banks.
The responses to foreign exchange shocks are depicted in Figures 7 and 8. These figures, in
line with previous IRFs, suggest a negative relationship between foreign exchange rate and depos-
its and credits. This is especially important since the appreciation of the foreign currency leads to
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decline in deposits and credits. Levy-Yeyati, Martınez-Perıa, and Schmukler (2010) examine the
role of various macroeconomic factors on depositor behaviour. The authors find that macroecon-
omic factors are important drivers of depositor behaviour in times of upheavals, sometimes even
dominating the role of bank-specific characteristics. During times of macroeconomic and monetary
changes, bank portfolios may be severely hit by the shocks (Brooks, 2007; Levy-Yeyati et al.,
2010). The depositor discipline literature suggests that depositors punish or reward their banks
based on their performance at these times (see e.g. Martınez-Perıa & Schmukler, 2001). Islamic
banks are in general more liquid and better capitalised to absorb these shocks, however less cap-
able to shield their loan portfolios from monetary shocks. These banks are often constrained by
limited sources of funds while conventional banks can use larger pools of financing. This incapa-
bility is also related to the size of these banks, as argued by Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Stein
and Kashyap (2000), since small banks may find it relatively more difficult to raise external funds
in times of monetary tightening. The funding constraints may thus hit Islamic banks more severely
than conventional banks. The greater response of Islamic bank depositors to foreign exchange
shocks may also be due to limited investment opportunities at Islamic banks, while these can be
mitigated by various conventional instruments that introduce hedging against currency risks.
Hence, a possible explanation for the larger decline in Islamic bank deposits may be that deposi-
tors divert their deposits to foreign currency denominated investments for hedging purposes as a
response to the appreciation of foreign currencies (Blejer, Feldman, & Feltenstein, 2002).
Regarding the credits’ response, the rise in the foreign exchange rates, that is, the appreciation
of the US dollar against domestic currency, is having a debilitating effect on SMEs. It could be
argued that export-oriented SMEs enjoy the rise in foreign exchange rate; however, SMEs face
–0.0100
0.0000
0.0100
0.0200
Cr
ed
it_
Co
nv
en
tio
na
l
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s
cpi shock
–0.0300
–0.0200
–0.0100
0.0000
0.0100
Cr
ed
it_
Is
la
m
ic
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s
cpi shock
FIGURE 6 Impulse responses of credits to inflation shocks: conventional versus Islamic banks
AYSAN ET AL. | 687
with surging costs of energy in an oil-dependent country and rising prices in intermediate goods.
Additionally, it is a common trend in emerging market countries that SMEs borrow in cheaper for-
eign currency, although their cash inflows are mainly in domestic currency. When it is considered
that hedging practices against foreign currency risk is still at low levels in emerging economies,
credit demands are more often rejected due to heightened risks of the firms. This issue was under-
lined by Basci (2006) who states that cheaper external borrowing coupled with the appreciation of
domestic currency spurred borrowing abroad in Turkey. The author however notes that customers
often did not hedge against currency risk, the end results of which is translated into sizeable credit
risk for the banking sector.
5.2 | Robustness checks
5.2.1 | Alternative estimations with restricted samples
We present two robustness tests with alternative estimations to check the validity of our results. Ber-
nanke and Blinder (1992) propose that monetary policy is transmitted through several stages. There is
a spillover from exchange rate to the inflation rate and that affects the general economy. This assump-
tion is valid for Turkey since foreign exchange fluctuations affect inflation with some delay through
the foreign trade channel. As an import-dependent economy with sizeable current account deficits,
the level of inflation in the country is closely dependent on foreign exchange rate. However, due to
complex interactions between the variables, we check the sensitivity of our results with alternative
orderings as the first robustness check (see e.g. Grossmann, Love, & Orlov, 2014; Lof & Malinen,
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2014; Kim & Lee, 2008, for similar sensitivity analysis). We try several other orderings and re-esti-
mate the panel-VAR. The main results remain unchanged. As we run various orderings, the results
are not reported here to save space but are available upon request from the authors.
During the inspection of the bank observations, it is noticeable that the heterogeneity in the con-
ventional bank sample is significant. For instance, several conventional banks have operated for
over a century and have extensive branch coverage. On the other hand, some of the conventional
banks have operated for around thirty years and their branch coverage is still expanding. The char-
acteristics of banks, e.g., size, age and branch coverage, can directly have an impact on the beha-
viour of bank deposits and credits. Although we consider cross-sectional heterogeneity by
employing the panel-VAR framework, we study a more restricted but matched sample of conven-
tional banks as the second robustness check. As a benchmark, we focus on the average asset size of
the banks during the sample period. We arbitrarily select those banks whose average asset size is
larger than 10 billion Turkish lira and obtain a restricted bank sample that are more comparable with
Islamic banks in terms of their asset size. In doing so, the number of conventional banks is reduced
to 15 banks.
The estimation results and impulse responses do not change by restricting the sample. In the
restricted sample, we obtain significant responses for credits which have been insignificant in the
whole sample.7 The composition of credit portfolio in Islamic banks is the main reason why credits
respond significantly and largely to monetary and macroeconomic shocks in Islamic banks. Since
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7
See Figure A3 in the Appendix.
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small banks are more specialised in SME lending (Hubbard et al., 2002; Shaban et al., 2014),
credits’ responses in the restricted sample turn out to be significant.
5.2.2 | The impact of portfolio composition
Our final robustness test is about our explanation on the larger responses of credits to monetary
and macroeconomic shocks in Islamic banks. While discussing the larger responses of credits in
Islamic banks to monetary and corresponding macroeconomic shocks, we emphasised the composi-
tional differences in credit portfolios between Islamic and conventional banks. Our main argument
was that Islamic banks are more inclined to finance SMEs which are more vulnerable to monetary
and macroeconomic shocks. To test the validity of this argument, we solely employ SME credits
of both conventional and Islamic banks. By restricting the credits sample to SME credits only, we
are able to check the robustness of our argument whether or not the composition of credit portfolio
is an important factor in the relationship between monetary policy and credits.
We take the SME definition of Turkish Statistical Institute as a baseline to identify SME cred-
its. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (T€urkiye _Istatistik Kurumu), micro-sized enter-
prises are those having less than 10 employees or annual sales of less than 1 million Turkish lira,
whereas small enterprises are the businesses having 10–49 employees or annual sales of 1–5 mil-
lion Turkish lira. Finally, medium-sized enterprises have 50–249 employees or annual sales of 5–
25 million Turkish lira. The credits in a bank portfolio is named as SME credits if they are
extended to any of these enterprises. To check how SME credits in conventional banks and Islamic
banks respond to policy rate changes, we estimate a bivariate VAR model which incorporates
SME credits instead of total credits.
–0.0150
–0.0100
–0.0050
0.0000
sm
e_
cr
ed
it_
pr
iv
at
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s
ir shock
–0.0100
–0.0080
–0.0060
–0.0040
–0.0020
0.0000
sm
e_
cr
ed
it_
sta
te
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s
ir shock
–0.0300
–0.0200
–0.0100
0.0000
sm
e_
cr
ed
it_
Is
la
m
ic
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s
ir shock
–0.0200
0.0000
0.0200
0.0400
0.0600
sm
e_
cr
ed
it_
fo
re
ig
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s
ir shock
FIGURE 9 Impulse responses of SME credits to policy rate shocks: different bank types
690 | AYSAN ET AL.
As an initial exercise for the final robustness check, we do not only estimate the bivariate
model for Islamic banks, but also for different conventional bank ownership forms. Figure 9 pre-
sents the responses of SME credits to policy rate changes in private banks, foreign banks, state
banks and Islamic banks. This classification enables us to explore any differences in the responses
once it is considered that SME credit responses in different bank ownerships, that is, foreign banks
and state-owned banks, can be totally different. The evidence supports the claim that foreign banks
are expected to shy away from SME lending (Beck & Demirg€uc-Kunt, 2006; Clarke, Cull, &
Martınez-Perıa, 2006; De Haas, Ferreira, & Taci, 2010; Detragiache, Tressel, & Gupta, 2008), on
the other hand, state-owned banks can be used as a special vehicle to support development and
alleviate the burden of crisis on SMEs (World Bank, 2012). The bivariate VAR results show that
except for foreign banks, SME credits respond significantly to policy rate changes in all bank
types. The response of SME credits in Islamic banks is the largest which is in line with our previ-
ous findings. However, the response of SME credits in state-owned banks is the smallest which
may suggest that these banks are mandated to support SME financing. When SMEs are hit by
monetary and macroeconomic shocks, state-owned banks would be the likely ones which would
be more likely to continue lending to SMEs as expanding access to finance is often among their
top objectives (Behr, Norden, & Noth, 2013; De Haas et al., 2010). We also estimate the same
bivariate VAR model for conventional (private and state banks) and Islamic banks. Figure 10 sug-
gests that SME credits in conventional and Islamic banks are both responsive to monetary shocks.
Overall, our findings deliver strong support for the finding that large and significant response of
credits’ response in Islamic banks is largely due to their tendency towards financing SMEs.
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6 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is a growing debate on the differences between Islamic and conventional banking. This
paper provides new insights for why the bank lending channel works differently for Islamic banks
compared to their conventional counterparts. Our main finding is that Islamic banks’ credits and
deposits are significantly more responsive to policy rate changes, indicating the significance of the
balance sheet channel through these banks in the transmission of monetary policy.
Possible explanations for this finding are related to deposits and credits in both banking
schemes. At the liabilities side, we highlight Islamic depositors’ risk aversion and the inertia of
rates at Islamic banks behind the stronger response of Islamic deposits. Religiosity is generally
associated with higher risk aversion that might lead to larger deposit withdrawal against a positive
monetary shock. Further, Islamic banks are highly dependent on deposits—funding which makes
them more responsive to monetary shocks. The prohibition of interest in Islamic banking prevents
them to adjust their deposit rates swiftly. Islamic banks can only change their rates through some
indirect manipulations and with some delay during which depositors may withdraw their deposits.
On the assets side, we emphasise that Islamic banks’ tendency towards SMEs financing is one of
the fundamental reasons for why credits in Islamic banks are more responsive to policy rate
changes. This demonstrates that monetary transmission is more effective through Islamic banks
and those small-sized conventional banks having strong relations with SMEs.
In the context of high growth expectations for the Islamic banking industry worldwide, it is crucial
for regulators to understand whether Islamic banking has desirable outcomes or some unintended side
effects on financial stability and real economy. We find that monetary transmission is more effective
through Islamic banks which helps policymakers to manage economy in a smoother way. Since
SMEs add significantly to labour force participation in domestic economies and Islamic banks have
certain advantages in SME lending, central banks’ control over employment and domestic output can
be facilitated through Islamic banking. However, since Islamic banks are more responsive to mone-
tary and macroeconomic shocks—and so do SMEs, central banks should be aware that monetary con-
tractions might have repercussions on unemployment and growth through Islamic banks.
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